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Hurry Up and Have an Accident:
Comprehensive General Liability
Contract Standard Pollution
Exclusion Clause Includes a
Temporal Element
Charter Oil Company v. American Employers' Insurance'

Chemical Company (NAPACCO). 3 NAPACCO's waste contained dioxin,
which, in sufficient concentrations, has
been found to be harmful to humans,
plants, and animals.
Bliss did not appropriately dispose of
the hazardous waste.6 Five times between February, 1991, and October,
1971, Bliss moved the waste to Frontenac, Missouri, where he mixed it with
Later Bliss
waste oil and stored it. 7
sprayed the dioxin laced waste oil as a
dust suppressant at various locations
throughout Missouri.'

When the government and public become aware of the dioxin contamination
at the sites Bliss sprayed, IPC faced class
action suits from the United States and the
State of Missouri. 9 In addition, over
1,600 claimants in 57 separate actions,
filed civil suits alleging bodily injury and
property damage from the dioxin contaminated soil.1 o The individuals requested
aggregate relief of $4 billion, and punitive damages of $4 billion." All of the
private suits, except one, had been settled
by the time the trial court rendered its
opinion in January, 1994.12 Settlements
with the United States and the State of
Missouri were also awaiting court

by Kevin Murphy

law, the "pollution exclusion clause"
In Charter Oil Company v. American would be interpreted in favor of the insurEmployers' Insurance Company, Charter ers. However, it is still unclear whether
appealed the lower court's decision, seek- Missouri state courts would decide the
ing coverage based on comprehensive case as the D. C. Circuit predicted.
Applying Missouri
liability insurance.
law, the Court of Appeals found that the II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1971, Independent Petrochemical
insurance companies did not have to
cover Charter's CERCLA costs because Corporation (IPC), a wholly-owned subthe insurance contract only covered sidiary of plaintiff/appellant Charter Oil
"sudden and accidental" environmental (Charter), hired independent contractor
damage. One of a multitude of courts to Russell Bliss to dispose of hazardous
interpret this "pollution exclusion clause," waste materials. 2 IPC disposed of the approval. "
IPC sought coverage from insurance
the D. C. Circuit held that under Missouri waste as a courtesy to IPC's customer,
4
which had been purchased
policies1
and
Pharmaceutical
Northeastern

1. INTRODUCTION

69 F.3d 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Id.
3 Id. of 1 162.
4
Independent Petrochemical Corp. (IPC) v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 842 F. Supp. 575 (D.D.C. 1994), off'd sub nom.Charter Oil Co. v. American
Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
5
Charter, 69 F.3d. at 1162.
6
The trial court and appellate cases leave some doubt as to whether Bliss acted knowingly. The appellate opinion suggested that Bliss did not know that the
waste oil he sprayed contained dioxin. See Charter, 69 F.3d at 1162 ("Bliss Oil's president tasted the oil to check its suitability for other uses and found the flavor
'

2

.

fit, Bliss sprayed it as a dust suppressant . . . throughout Missouri .

. .

. The waste oil turned out to contain dioxin ....

) The trial court's more detailed opinion

indicated that Bliss mixed hazardous waste with oil before spraying it in Missouri. Charter, 69 F.3d at 1162. However, the trial court held that it did not need to
decide if Bliss polluted intentionally, but only that he intentionally sprayed the contaminated oil. IPC, 842 F. Supp. at 584.
7
IPC, 842 F.Supp. at 676.
8 Id. EPA found the soil to be contaminated in 29 different locations as a result of Bliss's spraying. These locations included Times Beach, Shenandoah
Stables, Timberline Stables, Bubbling Springs Stable, Saddle and Spur Club, Rosati/Piazza Road, Frontenac, Quail Run, Castlewood/Sontog Road,
Highway 100/Erxleben, East North Street, Lacy Monor/Sandcut Road, Bliss Farm/Mid-America Arena, Bull Moose Tube Company, Hamill Transfer Company,
Jones Truck Line, Overnight Transport/P.L.E, Southern Cross Lumber, Arkansas Best Freight, Bonifield Brother Trucking, Community Christian Church,
Manchester Methodist Church, Baxter Garden Center, Access Road to Old Highway 141, East Texas Freight, Bristol Steel, Hellwig Fruit Market,
Minker/Stout/Romaine Creek, and Southwestern Bell. Id. at 676 n.3.
9
Independent Petrochemical Corp. (IPC) v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 842 F. Supp. 575, 576 ID.D.C. 1994).
10 Id.

1 Id.
12
13

Id.
Id.
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between 1971, the year when IPC
agreed to assist NEPACCO in disposing
of the hazardous waste, and 1983, the
filing of Charter Oil.15 Charter sued the
insurers in November 1983, seeking a
declaratory judgment that would force
them to indemnify Charter for Bliss' oil
spraying activities.' 6 The defendants in
that action were the twenty-three different
insurers that had issued IPC sixty-seven
primary and excess liability policies. 7 In
February, 1991, the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, in
cases, where New York law controlled.' 8
At trial, the court granted summary
judgment for those defendants over whom
Missouri law was controlling.' Summary
judgment was granted because each of
the defendant insurance companies had
standardpollution exclusion clauses in their
insurance contracts that did not allow recovery for releases of pollution.20 These
pollution exclusion clauses, however, contained exceptions that permitted recovery
for "sudden and accidental" discharges
of pollutants.2" The specific prevision at
issue stated that the insurance did not
cover:
[blodily injury or property

damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials
or
other
irritants,
contaminants or pollutants into or
upon land, the atmosphere or
any watercourse or body of water, but this exclusion does not
apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden
and accidental.22
Three of the four types of pollution exclusion clauses read the same as the one
above.23 The remaining form of insurance
contract, issued by Travelers, included an
exception that allowed for indemnification
if the pollution was neither "expected" nor
"intended." 2 The parties agreed that the
"expected nor intended" language was
functional equivalent to "accidental." 25
The Travelers contract did not include language corresponding to the other contracts' use of the word "sudden."26
Charter argued that the "sudden and
accidental" clause was ambiguous, and
as such should be interpreted against the

insurance companies, the parties who
drafted the contract. 27 Accordingly, Charter argued, the insurers would, therefore,
have to indemnify them for the remediation costs associated with the cleanup of
the dioxin. 28 The trial court refused to accept this argument holding that under Missouri law the insurance companies had no
duty to indemnify. 29 The D. C. Circuit
Court of Appeals also found in favor of
the insurance companies. 30 That court
held that under Missouri law the phrase
"sudden and accidental" was not sufficiently ambiguous and that the counterbalancing public policy considerations of
allowing insurance companies to reserve
prevented
exclusions all
pollution
recovery 3

Ill.

LEGAL HISTORY
Generally speaking, Comprehensive
General Liability (CGL) insurance policies
are designed to protect businesses against
liability to third parties. 32 Available for all
types of commercial ventures, CGLs require the insurer to defend the insured if
litigation arises, and indemnify the insured
for any payment resulting from a business

Id.
Id.
1
Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
7
IPC, 842 F.Supp at 576. Defendants in this action were.Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna), American Employers' Insurance Company (American
Employers), American Home Assurance Company (American Home), American Re-Insurance Company (American Re-Insurance), Continental Casualty Company,
Continental Insurance Company, Employers Commercial Union Insurance Company, First State Insurance Company, Harbor Insurance Company, Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Co., Insurance Company of North America, The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, North Star Reinsurance Company,
Stonewall Insurance Company, The Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers), Unigard Security Insurance Company, and Certain London Market Defendants (the
London Defendants). Id.
" IPC, 842 F.Supp at 576.
1A

15

Id.

Charter, 69 F.3d at 1162.
Id.
22 Id. at 1163.
23
Id. The trial court referred to this form of exclusion as the "domestic insurers exclusion." IPC, 842 F. Supp. at 577. The trial court also mentioned
what it
referred to as the "London exclusion" and the "INA exclusion." Id. Charter and defendants agreeded that the domestic insurers exclusion, the London exclusion,
and the INA exclusion should all be interpreted identicallybased on the theory that the word "accidental" is nearly identical to the words "expected and intended"
in some of the insurers' contracts. Id.
24
Independent Petrochemical Corp. (IPC v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 842 F. Supp. 575, 577 (D.D.C. 1994).
25 Id
21

26

Id.

Id. at 576.
Id.
29
Id. at 585.
30 Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
31 Id. at 1163.
1
Carl A. Salisbury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, The Standard-Form Pollution Exclusion, and the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collective
Amnesia, 21 Evn. L.357, 359 n.6 (19911.
27
28
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loss. 3 Under a CGL policy, the insurer
has five obligations: 1) promoting safety
and reducing claims; 2) investigating
claims; 3) defending policy holders in
suits; 4) indemnifying policy holders when
obligated; 5) helping to mitigate losses. 34
CGLs are standardized in order to
make them easier to interpret.35 The idea
is that once courts have interpreted a
given policy, an insurance company can
plan financially for the future because the
company knows what the likelihood is that
it will have to pay out on the policy.36 A
trade organization, Insurance Service Office (ISO), drafts many of the CGL standard policies which are used by almost
every major American insurance company.3 1 ISO was responsible for drafting
the standard pollution exclusion that was
the subject of the instant case. 3 a Generally, the insured purchases the policy from
a broker without having any input on the
language of the policy and in many cases
not seeing the policy contract until they
have already paid for it. 3 9

During the last two decades potential
environmental liability for business has increased to the level that coverage has become essential to the survival of many
business. 40 Business owners who have
purchased CGL policies to guard against
liability have turned to the insurance policies they purchased during the seventies
and early eighties for environmental coverage.4 ' Insurance companies, however,
often refuse to indemnify, arguing that the
"sudden and accidental" clause only covers pollution that is both "unexpected and
unintended" and abrupt, a burden few
insureds can overcome. 42 This, "sudden
and accidental" exclusionary clause was
found in practicallyevery CGL between

1973 and 1985. 43
The ambiguous nature of the "sudden
and accidental" language has prompted
numerous lawsuits against various insurance companies throughout the years.
Courts, however, have failed to agree on
a consistent interpretation of the language." The fact that almost every CGL

purchased between 1978 and 1985
contains this same "sudden and
accidental" exclusionary clause makes the
need for a uniform interpretation all the
more important.45 Apparently in an attempt to establish more predictability, the
ISO replaced the standard pollution exclusion with an "absolute pollution exclusion."46 Businesses, however, still face
unpredictable litigation under the old standard pollution exclusion for pollution
events that occurred during the years
where the older pollution exclusion clause
was used.47
As the interpretation of the pollution
exclusion clause began to be litigated,
courts unanimously held that "sudden and
accidental" meant unexpected, unintended, and abruptly beginning.4 The
first case to interpret the exclusion clause
was Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection. 49 Vandals had opened
the valve of an oil storage tank, spilling oil
onto Lansco's property, and a nearby
river.50 Even though the actual pollution

Sharon M. Murphy, The "Sudden and Accidental" Exception to the Pollution Exclusion Clause in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: The
Gordian Knot of Environmental Liability, 45 VAND. L.REV.161, 163. Usually, CGL policies promise "'to pay on behalf of the insured all sums ... [it is] legally to
pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which the insurance applies caused by an occurrence ... "' Id. at n.7.
See Salisbury, supra note 32, at 359 n.6.
3s
See Murphy, supra note 33, at 164.
36 Id.
17
Id. at 164 n. 17.
" Nancer Ballard and Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REv.610,
625 n.59 (1990).
SId. at 621.
o Id.at 612. The increase in of liability is in large part due to the passage of environmental statutes such as CERC[A.
41

Id.

2 Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Murphy, supra note 33, at 167. In 1985, because insurance companies were facing overwhelming liability costs, the ISO removed all coverage for pollution
4
based injuries. Id.
" Ballard and Manus, supro note 38, at 612. The authors found at least one court which had taken note of the smorgasbord of judicial viewpoints:
There is a plethora of authority (on the pollution exclusion] from jurisdictions throughout the United States which, depending on the facts presented an the
allegations of the underlying complaints, go "both ways" on the issues presented today. The cases swim the reporters like fish in a lake. The Defendants
would have this Court pull up its line with a trout on the hook, and argue that the lake is full of trout only, when in fact the water is full of bass, salmon,
and sunfish, too. Id at n.7, (citing Pepper's Steel and Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541, 1549-50 (S.D Fla.
1987).
4
Id.
Amy Timmer, Are They Lying Now or Were They Lying Then? The Insurance Industry's Ambiguous Pollution Exclusion: Why the Insurer, and Not the Innocent
46
L.REv.355, 357 n.3 (1994). The post-1 986 exclusion now reads:
Insured, Should Pay for Pollution Caused by Prior landowners, 46 BAYLOR
damage arising out of the contamination of the environment by pollutants
property
injury
or
to
personal
not
apply
does
policy
this
that
is
agreed
It
introduced at any time into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water or aquifer. This exclusion applies whether or not the
contamination is introduced into the environment intentionally or accidentally or gradually or suddenly and whether or not the insured or any other person
or organization is responsible for the contamination. Id.at 375 n.72.
A
See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
As Ballard and Manus, supra note 38, at 633. For this initial section, I adopt the cases and organization chosen by the author.
A 350 A.2d 520 (NJ. Super. 1975), off'd 368 A.2d 363 (NJ. Super. Ci. App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 372 A.2d 322 (NJ. 1977).
Id.atS21.
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wasintentional, an act of vandalism, the
court held that the pollution was "sudden
and accidental" from Lansco's perspective." Based on dictionary definitions of
both accidental and sudden, the court decided that the clause must exclude coverage for pollution that is unexpected and
unintended.52 Pollution by third party vandals was not intended or expected by the
insured, so the court held that the exclusion clause did not apply in Lasco's situation.5 ' In 1982, in Jackson Township
Municipal Utilities Authority v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co.,54 for the first
time a court held that an insured could
recover if the damages were unexpected,
although intended. 55 This was a development from previous decisions which had
allowed coverage in cases where the pollution was unintended.56 In this case, the
court found waste that seeped from an
intentionally made landfill to be insurable.57 Rather than ending the effectiveness of the pollution exclusion clause as
had been predicted, Jackson actually created a backlash that caused subsequent
courts to find for the insurers. 58
In Waste Management of Carolinas,
Inc. v. Peerless Insurance Ca. 59 , the court
found for the insurers on the basis that a
"sudden and accidental" pollution must
si
52

be instantaneous,'
A waste hauler
dumped hazardous waste into a landfill,
which subsequently seeped into the environment. 6 ' The court ruled that, to avoid
a redundancy in the "sudden and accidental" language, "occurrence," which
refers to the "sudden and accidental" pollution, must mean "instantaneous." 62 The
court observed that the dumping may
have happened suddenly, but the harmful
seepage from the dump leached slowly
into the groundwater.6' The court held
that the slow, harmful seepage into
groundwater, even if unexpected and unintended, was precluded by the pollution
exclusion clause.6 Thus, insureds could
not recover.65
One case often cited by insureds is,
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co." This case illustrates howdivided the
courts were after Peerless. The court in
Claussen observed the conflict between
courts that had interpreted "sudden and
accidental" to simply mean unexpected,
and courts that had assigned the phrase
the additional meaning of "abrupt. "67
The court used ordinary dictionary definitions to resolve the conflict.68 The court
found that the word sudden could mean
both "unexpected" and "abrupt," 69 although the primary definition of sudden

seemed to be "unexpected". 70 Some dictionaries, however, also included "abrupt"
within the definition.7 1 The court noted
that:
[Il]t is indeed difficult to think of
'sudden" without a temporal connotation: a sudden flash, a sudden burst of speed, a sudden
bang. But, on reflection one realizes that, even in its popular
usage, "sudden" does not usually
describe the duration of an event,
but rather its unexpectedness: a
sudden storm, a sudden turn in
the road, sudden death. Even
when used to describe the onset
of an event, the word has an
elastic temporal connotation that
varies with expectations: Suddenly, it's spring.72
Because the court recognized that there
was more than one plausible definition for
the pollution exclusion clause, the
Claussen court followed the rule that ambiguous contract terms are to be construed
in favor of the insured.73 The court dismissed Aetna's argument that when the
contact was entered into no one anticipated the extent of pollution liability that
lay ahead.' The court observed that insurance companies must bear the brunt of

Id. at 524.
Id.

Id.
- 451 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
Is Id. at 995.
56
Id. at 993-94.
s7 Id. at 994.
s" Ballard and Manus, supro note 38, at 636.
5
340 S.E.2d 374 (1986).
6
Id. at 380.
61 Id. at 374.
62 Id. at 381. Ballard and Manus call this a misconstruction of the word "occurrence," and believe
the ruling has resulted in successful arguments by insurers for
the last decade. Ballard and Manus, supro note 38, at 640.
61 Peerless, 340 S.E.2d at 340.
6
Id.
6 Id.
6
380 S.E.2d 686 (1989).
6
Id. at 688.
s3

68

Id.

Id.
70 Id. See WEBSTERS'
THIRD
NEw INTERNAIlONAL DicTioNARY 2284 (10th ed. 1995). See also BLACK'S
"i Cloussen, 380 S.E.2d at 688.
72
Id.
3 Id.
69

74

[Aw

DIc1oNmARY 1284 (6th ed. 1990).

Id. ot 689.
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any lack of clarity.' 5 In addition, the court
found that the interpretation advanced by
Claussen was not contrary to that given
by insurers at the time the clause was created, that in most cases the "sudden and
accidental" clause would still make only
intentional polluters liable.' 6
The court in Morton, Inc. v. General
Accident Insurance Company of America77 also found in favor of the insureds,
but based its decision on the representations made by the insurance companies at
the time the standard pollution exclusion
clause was adopted, rather than the lanThe court overturned a
guage itself.'
lower court decision and held that
"sudden and accidental" included a temThe Morton court said
poral element.'
that it would be unfair to insureds to interpret "sudden and accidental" beyond simply "unexpected and unintended" in light
ofrepresentations the insurance industry
made to state regulators. 80 The court
noted that in a non-regulatory context, it
regularly construed misrepresentations by
insurers about what the policy covered as
grounds to estop the insurer from asserting
that the contract did provide suc coverage.i Because the insurance company
had made misrepresentations to the state
regulatory agency and others, the court
had no trouble finding in favor of the
75

Id.

76

Id.

"

629 A.2d 831 ( NJ. 1993).

78

Id. at 873.

7

Id. at 847.

80

Id.

81

Id.

insureds.82
In Missouri, the principal case interpreting the "sudden and accidental" language is Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
General Dynamics83 This is the only
Eighth Circuit case to use Missouri contract law to interpret this language. At the
trial court level, the court held for insureds.84 That court pointed out that Missouri low required provisions designed to
restrict coverage of insureds to be construed against the insurer, with the insurer
bearing the burden of expressing the limitation in clear and unambiguous terms. 85
In addition, the court noted that Missouri
courts give insurance contracts their plain
meaning, and when there is duplicity, indistinctness or uncertainty of meaning, or
where the policy is reasonably and fairly
open to different constructions, an ambiguity is created.86 Furthermore, the court
held that both the insured and insurer's
definitions were reasonable interpretations
of the "sudden and accidental' language. ' Since an ambiguity existed, the
contract had to be construed in favor of
the insureds, as controlled by Missouri
law." The trial court also observed that
the drafting history of the pollution exclusion clause illustrates the insurance
companies intended "sudden and accidental" to mean "unexpected and

without any temporal
unintended"
connotations. 89
On appeal, the decision in favor of
the insureds was overturned. In relevant
part, the court noted that other courts have
been split on this issue; many courts have
found for insureds holding "sudden and
accidental" means only unexpected,
while others have held "sudden and accidental" to include a temporal element
from
coverage
includes
which
non-"gradual" pollution."

The appellate

court chose the second view.91 Unless
the pollution was both unexpected and
unintended, as well as sudden, General
Dynamics would not be covered. 92
In deciding for the insurers, the appellate court in General Dynamics also
pointed out that Missouri requires that insurance contracts be given their plain
meaning. 93 However, the court noted that
all of the terms in the contract must be
given meaning.9' The General Dynamics
court based this view on what the Charter
court referred to as the anti-redundancy
canon.9' In Missouri, courts interpret ambiguous terms with two possible constructions to exclude any meaning that creates
a "redundant, illusory, absurd, and therefore unreasonable" result. 96
General Dynamics recognized that
courts generally agree that "accidental"

Id. at 875.
968 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1992).
" Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 783 F. Supp. 1199 lE.D. Mo. 1991), off'd in port, rev'd in part, and remanded 968 F.2d 707
(8th Cir. 1992)..
82
83

8s

Aetnaoat 1207.

a

Id.at 1208 (citing Nixon v. Life Investors Ins. Co., 675 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Pearce v. General American Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d
536, 539 (8th Cir. 1980)).
87 Aetna, 783 F. Supp. at 1208.
88

Id. at 1209.

89

Id.

*

General Dynamics, 968 F.2d at 710.

91
9

Id.

Id.
Id. (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988)).
' General Dynamics, 968 F.2d at 710 (citing Harnden v. Continental Ins. Co. 612 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Mo. Cf. App. 1981)). See supro notes 66-76 and
accompanying text (Cloussen makes no mention of the rule that requires all insurance contract terms be given meaning).
" Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
9
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means unexpected. 97 '
If accidental
means "unexpected," then to interpret the
whole phrase "sudden and accidentaV' as
"unexpected" leaves the word "sudden"
without any real meaning. 98
Thus,
"sudden" must mean abrupt, because otherwise, the word would be superfluous.'
Therefore, the court held, the insurer does
not have to cover General Dynamics, because the pollution exclusion clause does
not apply to cases where the pollution is
not unexpected and abrupt."

IV.

INSTANT DECISION

The court began by noting that there
have been no Missouri decisions interpreting the "sudden and accidental" language of a CGL pollution exclusion
clause.'' Because the Missouri Supreme
Court refuses to accept cases certified to it
from federal courts,' 02 the court was left to
interpret Missouri law without state
guidance. 103

First, the court set out Charter's arguments.'" Charter argued that the "sudden
and accidental" language of the CGL
was facially ambiguous; that it could be

interpreted to mean "unexpected and unintended" or "unexpected, unintended,
and abrupt."' 05 Charter, favoring the former interpretation, argued that under Missouri low, ambiguous insurance contracts
should be construed in a light most favorable to the insured.'" Thus, went Charter's reasoning, the facially ambiguous
language, "sudden and accidental,"
should be interpreted to favor coverage.'0 7 In the alternative, Charter argued
that the phrase, "sudden and accidental,"
constituted a latent ambiguity.10" In the
absence of extrinsic evidence in favor of
the insurer's, Charter argued that the latent ambiguity should also be construed in
their favor.'"
The court, addressing Charter's facial
ambiguity argument, observed that Missouri
applied an "anti-redundancy
canon."ii 0 Under the anti-redundancy
canon, Missouri requires that all words in
an insurance contract be given meaning.i'
Based on the Eighth Circuit interpretation of "sudden and accidental"
under Missouri law in Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp.," 2
the court decided that the trial court had

correctly applied the anti-redundancy theory to Charter's arguments."'
The court observed that, taken together, the words sudden and accidental
must have a temporal element because to
hold otherwise would make the word
"accidental" an ambiguity after the word
"sudden.""' The court made this observation after analyzing the competing definitions of the word sudden.'' 5 The court,
after defining "accidental" to mean
"unexpected,"' 16 noted that Charter's
definitions for both "sudden"
and
"unexpected" contained the same meaning: unexpected."' To allow "sudden"
to mean only "unexpected" would create
aredundancy since both "sudden" and
"accidental" would mean unexpected."'
The anti-redundancy canon requires that
"sudden" be defined to eliminate the redundancy."' Thus, "sudden" must mean
"abrupt," or "quick."' 20 Returning to the
whole phrase, the court held that "sudden
and accidental" meant that the pollution
must be both unexpected and temporally
abrupt.' 2' To hold otherwise, the court
said, would mean that insurance

*
"

Standard Meat Co. v. Taco Kid of Springfield, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
General Dynamics, 968 F.2d at 710, (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1966)).

98

Id.

Id.
10 Id.
101 Charter, 69 F.3d at 1163.
12 Id. See Harber v. Altec Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1993); Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940, 944
(D.C. Cir. 1991). See Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 380 S.E.2d 686 (1989) (providing an example of the certification process in Georgia).
103 Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1163 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
i0
Id.
9

105 Id.

Id.See Peters v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 853 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Mo. 1993), Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo.
1992).

i0

107 Charter, 69 F.2d at 1163.
108 Id.
109 Id.
io Id.

" Id.at 1164.
112Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. General Dynamics, 968 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1992).
"
Charter, 69 F.3d at 1163.

"" Id. The court based this interpretation on General Dynamics, which also interpreted "sudden and accidental" as it thought Missouri courts would have
interpreted these terms. General Dynamics, 968 F.2d at 707.
's Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
116 Id. at 1164.
117 Id.
Ila Id.
119 Id.

'2 Id. The court noted that, in Missouri, "all terms of an insurance contract be given meaning." General Dynamics, 968 F.2d at 710.
121 Charter, 69 F.3d at 1163.
MELPR
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companies would find it impossible to specifically exclude one member of a set of
closely related circumstances because insureds would be able to choose redundant meanings to limit the scope of
specific exclusions. 122
In addition, the court noted that under
Missouri law, policy contracts are given
their plain meaning, or the meaning that
would be "ordinarily understood by the
layman who bought and paid for the policy."123 The court cited to decisions of
other jurisdictions that have also decided
that "sudden" means "abrupt."l 24 Specifically, the court noted that the Ninth Circuit, interpreting California low in Smith v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 125 and the Tenth Circuit, interpreting Utah law in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 126 reached the
conclusion that sudden and abrupt were
synonyms in the "ordinary and popular"' 27 sense. 128
The court distinguished the instant case
from others that had interpreted "sudden"
Citing
to mean only "unexpected."'
examples from Cloussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 's,"ao the court noted13 1
that a "sudden" bend in the road is still
sudden for a driver on a familiar road,
that a "sudden" storm is not really sudden,
122
123

but also abrupt, and that a "sudden"
death usually does not describe a lingering death, but one that happens abruptly
in time. 132
The court then considered the purpose
of the policy's "sudden and accidental"
terminology.13 ' The court pointed out that
insurance companies may have intended
the "sudden" terminology as a back up to
the usual "unexpected and unintended"
language of occurrence contracts because pollution over a long duration is
morelikely to be intended by the insured. 3" This model of unintentional pollution become less fashionable with the
advent of CERCLA-style liability, but it
likely informed the insurers intent to rule
out pollution that was intentional. 135
The court observed that the policy language may have also been intended to
banish a moral hazard.136 If potential
polluters knew that their insurance would
cover them if they were sued for pollution,
they would have no incentive to dispose
Both insurer and
of waste properly."
in
excluding all but
insured are interested
accidental pollution in order to limit insurance liability, thus lowering insurers costs,
and thus lowering insureds' premiums. 138
To interpret "sudden" as "abrupt" added
another limiting factor guaranteeing that

fewer intended pollution events are covered by insurers. 139 Therefore, the court
noted that insurers could have plausibly
been interested in controlling moral hazard, thereby benefiting both insured and
insurers. 140
The court acknowledged that suddenness was an imperfect mechanism for ruling out unexpected harm. 141 Indeed, the
court observed that suddenness has little to
nothing to do with whether the harm is
unexpected.14 2 However, the court did
not require that suddenness, which was
but a proxy for unexpected harm, fit perfectly with that intent.' 43
the
Charter argued that even if
"sudden and accidental" clause was not
facially ambiguous, the phrase had a latent ambiguity that could only be resolved
by looking to information outside the contract.144 This latent ambiguity, Charter
argued, stemmed from "the insurers' prior
claims behavior and representations made
to state insurance regulators." 14 5 The
court pointed out that once the latent ambiguity is established, Missouri allows a
broad range of extrinsic evidence to be
admitted to resolve it. 14 6 This evidence
includes the circumstances surrounding the
initial formation of the contract and the
behavior of the parties with respect to

Id. at 1165.

Charter, 69 F.3d at 1165 (citing Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Mo. 1982)).
Id.
125
22 F.3d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993).
126
962 F.2d 1484, 1487, 1489-90 (10th Cir. 1992).
127
Charter, 69 F.3d at 1165 (citing Smith, 22 F.3d at 1437).
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (1989).
131
Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1165-66 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
132
Id.
133
Id. at 1166.
134
Id. (citing Kenneth S. Abraham, ENVIONMENTAL bABILRY
INSURANCELAW 153 (1991)).
135
Charter, 69 F.3d at 1166.
124

136

Id.

'

Id.
Id.
Id.

138

'
140
141
142

Id.
Id.

143

Id.
Id.

I"

Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1167 ID.C. Cir. 1995).

'45 Id.
146 Id.

at 1168.
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other, similar contracts.' 47
Charter first argued that insurer's initial
payment to Charter of $2.8 million meant
that insurer's policy hadbeen given a
practical construction requiring payment of
the rest of the liability.'14 The insurers argued that any such payment should not
bind them to a single interpretation for all
similar clams.' 4 ' The court, agreeing
withe the insurers, held that to follow
Charter's logic would require insurers to
make an overly thorough investigation of
the claim before paying out even small
amounts, because payment of a small,
undeserving claim would bar the insurer
from later denying coverage. 50
The court likewise dismissed Charter's
claim that American Employers' Insurance
created an ambiguity contemporaneous
with drafting the exclusion clause in various fora.' 5 1 For example, Charter
claimed that, at that time, several insurance company heads had characterized
the "sudden" language as clarification to
the previous "unintended and unexpected" meaning of the clause.'"'
Charter claimed that the representations
created an ambiguity because insureds
were now unsure of whether "unexpected
and unintended" was going to be
interpreted as it had been before.'55 The
court decided in favor of the insurers.' 54
The court noted that the "clarifying"
statements should not be used against
insurers in light of the expanded scope of
147

Id.

1A9

Id.

'50

Id.

Charter, 69 F.3d at 1168.
153

154

The court dismissed Charter's other at-

tempts at showing a latent ambiguity, finding that statements in internal Aetna
memoranda and insurance industry publications failed to show that adding
"sudden" was anything but an attempt to
broaden the exclusion. 156
In a final effort, Charter argued that
insurer's misrepresentations to regulators
should bar enforcement of the exclusion

clause on the basis of public

Policy.' 57

The court reasoned that, since Genera/
Dynamics did not make a reasoned inquiry into the public policy argument, it
could not dismiss the argument outright. 5 8
However, the court noted that the Missouri
had neither legislative nor judicial doctrines that would allow for consideration
of misconduct before regulators, and that
even if Missouri had such a law, Charter
would have failed to establish any convincing discrepancy between insurers
statements and the pollution exclusion, 159
Having decided that "sudden" must
mean abrupt, the court then decided that
Bliss's sprayings were not abrupt.'6 The
court dismissed Charter's contention that
the discreet 30-40 minute sprayings were
abrupt asnonsensical. 6 ' The court again
noted that "sudden" was but an imprecise, but enforceable,
proxy for
"unexpected and unintended.
Finally, the court ruled that the
"Traveler" policy, since it did not include

the "sudden" language, could insur
e
Chorter if the discharge was accide
ntal.16 3

Since Charter

did not cie
"inescapable" authority, and since Cha
rter's strategy may have been
"sandbag" insurers into not dealing full
with the argument, the court deemed thi y
s
part of the argument waived."

V.

COMMENT
In Missouri,

the

"anti-redundanc

canon" is the key to deciding in favor cy
the insurance companies. Besides the inf
stant case and General Dynamics, a
Delaware court also found that the pollu
tion exclusion clause contained an ele
ment of abruptness based on its use of th
Missouri anti-redundancy rule.' 65 In thE
instant case, Missouri's anti-redundanc
canon appears to shortcut most argument
against construing the pollution exclusior
clause against insurers. However, Mis
souri state courts have not yet ruled on
whether pollution exclusion clause is en
forceable in Missouri. Nevertheless, because of inconsistencies created between
the Charter court's over-application of the
anti-redundancy canon to the pollution exclusion clause and the intent of the parties
involved, one might argue that Missouri
should not use the anti-redundancy rule to
find against the insureds in cases
interpreting
the pollution exclusion
clause.i6
Missouri's anti-redundancy rule makes

Id.

14

152

liability under statutes such as CERC[A.'

Id.
Id
Id.

T

u

s

15 Id.

Idfat 1169.

157

1
'n

c56

Id.

Id. al 1"69-1s170
Abex, 790 F.b2d
Charter, 69 F.a3d at 1170.

160
161

Id.

162

Id.
Id.
Idhat 1171.

uciting

n a125e.

Id. The court observed that if it allowed for Charter's argument, it would be forced to
concede that two months of spraying would constitute non-abrupt
spraying, while the same spraying with 5 minute breaks would be abrupt, and intemnifiable. Id.
163

'6

Hwe

Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 1993 WI 563253 *8 (Del. Super. Dec. 9, 1993).
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it less likely that the first typical argument
against construing the pollution exclusion
clause against insurers will be accepted.
In Charter, insureds made most of the arguments that insureds had successfully argued in other jurisdictions. For example,
the argument from Claussen that the plain
language of "sudden" and "accidental,"
can simply mean unexpected' 6 7 is disputed by the Missouri anti-redundancy
rule.' 6 s Though definitions of the common
usage of the word "sudden" seems to
mean unexpected, the court resolved the
ambiguity by pointing out that it would be
redundant for the words to mean the same
thing, thus sudden must connote abrupt.' 69
The anti-redundancy rule is misapplied
because of the great weight given to the
rule in deciding the meaning of the
clause. The case that is originally cited in
the General Dynamics case, Harnden v.
Continental Ins. Co."7 o, gives the rule that
no clause of an insurance contract should
perish by a court's construction of the contracts terms. 7' That case is distinguishable because it dealt with longer clauses
that would have been completely eliminated by the construction advocated,
rather, as in a pollution exclusion clause,
the repetition of a term for clarity. In other
non-insurance contract cases in Missouri,
there is an equivalent rule to the antiredundancy canon which states that the

"more probable and reasonable of two
available constructions should be utilized
to the exclusion of the one which produces a 'redundant, illusory, absurd, and
therefore unreasonable result.""l 72 However, it appears that this rule is only used
after the court has looked into extrinsic evidence of the parties intentions to resolve
the ambiguity.173 In addition, the insured's arguments do not seem absurd or
illusory. It does not seem absurd that the
insurance drafters may have intended two
words to mean the same thing: unexpected and unintended. If anything, it is
insurer's argument that adds term - here,
a - third meaning from two words:
"sudden."
The court's explanation of the imperfect "proxy" of the pollution exclusion
clause also seems troublesome. One of
the typical arguments of insureds is that
the pollution exclusion clause was intended to disallow coverage for insureds
who intentionally polluted their surroundings, and avoid the "moral hazard" of
indemnifying insureds who purposefully
foul the environment. Charter acknowledged that "suddenness" was an imperfect mechanism that had "little bearing"
on whether the harm was expected or inNonetheless, the court noted
tended."
that the proxy did not have to make a
"perfect fit" with the insurers' goal of

excluding intentional pollution, but only
had to approximate the desires of the parties to exclude intentional pollution. 175
The absence of "perfect fit" was not reason enough to "distort" the meaning of the
contract.176 It seems contradictory for the
court to have expended considerable effort resolving an redundancy by defining
"sudden and accidental" as "abrupt, unexpected, and unintended," only to later
point out that that the real intent of the parties was to rule out only unexpected andunintended harm.
Perhaps the court,
Circuit's use of
Eighth
the
by
constricted
the anti-redundancy rule, felt that it had no
choice but to use the rule to decide in favor of the insurers, but had made note that
the rule created a troublesome result. The
court's discussion of the proxy problem
illustrates the problematic effect of deciding a pollution exclusion clause solely on
the basis of the anti-redundancy rule.
In Charter, insureds showed evidence
that indicated that the original intent of the
parties had been to exclude coverage for
those pollution events that were not unexpected and unintended. 17 7 With its disproxies, the court
cussion of
acknowledged that the intent of the parties
had been to exclude coverage for events
only if they were expected and intended,
without the temporal requirement of
abruptness. 171 It seems that perhaps a

Commentators have written extensively in support of both sides. Arguments are often based on public policy grounds. Arguing in favor of the insurance
companies is Murphy, who based her view on the familiar moral hazard argument and also argued that the insurance companies would face too great of on
unexpected financial burden if they were to have to cover insureds under the pollution exclusion clause. See generally Murphy, supro note 33. For an industry that
conducts business by calculating risks, the insurance companies' miscalculation with the pollution exclusion clause could be hard on the industry, and thus increase
premiums for others.
Several scholars argue in favor of insureds. Timmer argued that innocent and unintentional polluters have been left in the cold by insurance companies, that
insurance companies themselves would have considered insureds in cases like the instant case to be covered when the clause was drafted, and that because the
nature of the business of insurance companies uniquely equips them for calculated risk taking, they should bear the cost of clean up. It also seems likely that finding
for coverage would lessen the risk of government paying clean-up bills when the costs are too high for the actual unintentional polluter. See generally Timmer, supro note 46.
Because insureds have lost all the cases that apply Missouri law, this article seeks to argue in favor of insureds.
7 See supra notes 6676 and accompanying text.
'" Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
10 See supro text accompanying note 79.
170 612 S.W.2d at 392.
171 Id. at 394.
172 Rouggly v. Whitman, 592 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Mo.
C1. App. 1979).
173 Id. at 518-21.
'" Charter, 69 F.3d at 1166.
175 id.
'6

i76 Id.
'"

Id.
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Missouri court reviewing the same issue Peerless court failed to
disting uish what
would get a more suitable result by adopt- "occurrence," the harmless du
mping or
ing the rule as it applies to normal con- the subsequent dangerous
see page into
tracts: that redundancy is one of the the environment, it was referrin
factors that may be considered when inter- so came to the erroneous concl g to, and
usion that
preting a contract, along with intent of the the insureds must be held lial
le. The
parties, but not the overriding concern. court based that ruling on the
courts readThis might especially be true when considing of a temporal element in the clause,
ering that insurance contracts in many ju- similar to the court in the
inst ant case,
risdictions,
including Missouri,
are based
on
the
sudden/a ccidental
contracts of adhesion that are to be con- redundancy.
strued in the light most favorable to the
At the trial level, General Dynamics
non-drafting party. Here, the insureds found for the insureds.
Seemingl
considered themselves indemnified for un- difference between the trial couy the only
rt's opinintentional pollution occurrences. While it ion and the case on appeal
is the appelis true that the words "sudden" and late court's use of
the anti-red undancy
"accidental" are redundant, perhaps that
rule. Thus, all of the elements cit(ed by the
factor should not be significant enough to trial court were overwhelmed
by the antioverwhelm the rules on contracts of adhe- redundancy rule.
For example, the trial
sion and extrinsic evidence at the time of court pointed out that extrinsic evi
dence of
drafting.
actions at the time of contracting can be
One commentator also points out that included to interpret a
contract,18 3 that incourts have teamed an anti-redundancy surance contracts are construed
in the ininterpretation with a misreading of which sured's favor when
ambiguity ari ses in an
event should under go the "sudden and exclusion that would limitinsured
's recovaccidental" analysis to get a "clear misery, 1" and that the drafting histo ry of the
reading" of the clause."
His argument clause evidenced the insurance board's
is that the line of cases, descended from intent for the clause to exclude a
Peerless, that find that the words must add tended pollution.'8 However, thE nly unina temporal element or otherwise be redun- did not mention many of these E appeal
lements.
dant, is based on a misreading of the Instead the appellate court took th
e shorter
clause from Peerless.iso The author ar- rule that, despite other evidence
for the
gues that, following a case that was to insureds, that the clause should be
inter"sound the death knell" of the pollution
preted based on whether two yords in
exclusion, there was a backlash by courts the contract was to be
interprete d based
in interpreting the clause more strictly than on the anti-redundancy canon.
any court, commentator, or even insurOne arguing for a change o f law in
ance company had thought of before.'
Missouri would also encounter is that inPeerless was part of that backlash.'82 The surance company representations at the

time of the drafting of the clause, oft used
against insurers, did not take piace in Missouri. A Delaware case pointed out that
to hold the insurance companies on public
policy grounds based on misrepresentations to state regulators would be pointless. This is because Morton, the New
Jersey case that found for the insureds on
the basis of misrepresentations before the
New Jersey regulatory. However, it is
unclear whether the same misrepresenta-

tions were made to Missouri regulators. 1 6

V.

CONCLUSION
Charter appears to be the continuation
of the difficulty courts have had in interpreting the standard pollution exclusion in
contracts since the Eighties. However difficult the decision, it is troubling that the
court would find for insureds in this case.
Based on the general rule that insurance
contracts are to be generally construed to
favor insureds, the Charter result is unnecessarily harsh. The insureds in this case
asked a third party to dispose of their
waste, assuming that he would do so
properly. Bliss failed to do so. This is not
a case of moral hazard. PC did not think
they could bury their own tainted oil without fear because insurance would cover
them. Though we might be able to justify
insureds responsibility for cleanup in this
case, the fact that PC must know cover
cleanup costs without the guard of insuronce, is wrong. insurance that they must
have assumed that they obtained in the
19 80's.

"

Id
Ballard and Manus, supro note 38, at 640.
80 Id.
181 Id. at 638.
"

Id. at 640.
" Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 783 F. Supp. 1199, 1208 (citing Press Machinery Corp.
v. Smith R.P.M. Corp., 727 F.2d 781,
784-785 (8th Cir. 1984); Tri-Lakes Newspapers, Inc. v. Logan, 713 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)) (holding
that relevant matters outside the
insurance contract may be considered when interpreting insurance policies).
" Aetna, 783 F. Supp. at 1208 (citing See Meyer Jewelry Co. v. General Ins. Co., 422 S.W.2d 617, 623
(Mo. 1968); Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 441
S.W.2d 15, 30 (Mo. 1969)) (stating that an insurance contract is designed to furnish protection and will, where reasonably
possible, be construed to accomplish
this object).
85 Aetna, 783 F.Supp. at 1209.
i8 Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 1993 WL 563253 at * 13 n16 (Del. Super. Dec.
9, 1993).
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